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I. INTRODUCTION
Foreign institutional investors (FIIs) have taken a keen interest in the Indian equity market and have been overweight the MSCI index since 2003. 2 While market capitalization of the large Indian stock exchanges is presently about 100 percent of GDP (around $1.3 trillion), FIIs hold about 25 percent of the market if cumulative dividends that are rolled over are included. However, market sources suggest that around 50 percent of FII flows have been via participatory notes (PNs). PNs, which are an offshore instrument against underlying Indian securities, can be issued as derivatives or cash. They allow investors, including hedge funds, high net worth individuals, and Indian-based firms abroad to enter and exit the India market while avoiding registration, settlement and other issues. On the other hand, NRIs (non resident Indians) are not permitted to use PNs.
Since 1992, when FIIs were allowed to invest in Indian equity markets after the balance of payments crisis, an offshore market for PNs developed as a primary conduit for foreign investors to invest in India. The origins of such flows stems from the bilateral tax treaty that India has had with Mauritius. The main provision of the 1983 treaty was that no resident of Mauritius would be taxed in India on capital gains arising from the sale of securities in India. The treaty therefore gave capital gains exemption for investments routed via Mauritius. Despite the uniform reduction in capital gains tax arbitrage that existed from the early 1990s through July 2004, it is interesting to note that there has been a rapid growth in the market for PNs in the last three to four years.
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Section II provides some background on how the market for PNs has evolved over time. Section III elucidates why this market continues to remain buoyant and suggests how the recent regulatory proposals on the PNs could impact capital flows in the near term.
II. USE OF PARTICIPATORY NOTES BY FOREIGN INVESTORS IN INDIAN EQUITY MARKET
The skirting of short-term capital gains tax by investing via PNs registered primarily in Mauritius has been going on for well over a decade. 4 The Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (henceforth, the Mauritius Treaty) has allowed 'certified residents' of Mauritius to pay corporate taxes in Mauritius that are effectively zero. 
Box 1. The Bilateral Tax Treaty between India and Mauritius
The bilateral tax treaty between India and Mauritius has helped in attracting FIIs to the Indian equity markets especially from 1992, when FIIs were allowed to invest after the balance of payment crisis. Entities based in Mauritius are exempted from capital gains tax arising from their investments in India. This resulted in several offshore funds registering in Mauritius to invest in India. Registering a company in Mauritius was (and is) expensive and cumbersome but it did avoid the capital gains tax that has been as high as 40 percent in the past. Mauritius has exploited their tax advantage and has raised costs to a point where some doubt it is worth bothering with that jurisdiction. There is still some tax arbitrage as derivatives are taxed at 33 percent onshore but tax-free offshore. This has given rise to sizable positions recently via PN issue on derivatives.
Hedge funds in recent years have found value in Indian equities. These investors usually do not have a long-term interest to register as an FII. Thus, they resort to Mauritius based entities that issue participatory notes (PNs) through which such investors can invest in India. Market sources and regulators have stated that the origins of such flows remain questionable. However, SEBI, the local regulator, classifies such PN inflows that are not registered in India under the 'FII inflows' category.
With capital gains tax arbitrage having almost disappeared and with expensive registration costs in Mauritius, it is intriguing why FIIs are not coming onshore. The PNs on derivatives are reportedly used primarily by hedge funds. 6 Typically, a hedge fund strategy is to hedge their exposure in a single security by taking a short position in the futures or options markets (e.g., Nifty). Offshore investors do not pay taxes, so these hedges yield higher net returns when the market rises. Thus, hedging strategies are seen to favor offshore investors. 7 As an example, the profit (whenever the position is closed) from being long in a blue chip and short the Nifty index, would be the mark-to market value of the long cash position in the blue chip less the cost of purchase of the blue chip holding, minus the amount lost on the index hedge (the increase in the index times the size of the position). Therefore, assuming PNs on derivative positions are about $30 billion this year, the loss from being short in Nifty is around $12 billion (or the 40 percent increase in Nifty this year times $30 billion). In this example, gains from offshore short-term tax arbitrage amounts to the 10 percent on being long in a blue chip. It is important to note that Nifty losses have to be paid via the 'margin' accounts as the losses accrue, even if the above trading strategy is not closed or unwound. However, if the trade was long Nifty/short blue chip, gains from offshore derivative tax arbitrage would be 33 percent. 7 These strategies have thrived, as the structures often allow some hedge funds to take larger exposure on a security than allowed onshore. Market sources indicate that although PN derivative positions are reported gross by FIIs, these are often after netting the short and long positions of various clients/sub-accounts. Thus, typically a hedge fund could take 10 percent long derivative position in a scrip (i.e., above the 5 percent cap allowed in that sector for the script, if the investment was made onshore), and another that takes a 6 percent short derivative position on this script (again, above the regulatory cap of 5 percent). This would be reported, via their conduit FII, to the regulator as a 4 percent holding on this script, within the permissible cap.
III. INDIAN REGULATORS PROPOSAL ON PARTICIPATORY NOTES AND IMPACT ON PORTFOLIO FLOWS
The SEBI's recent discussion paper on PNs states the notional value of PN issued is around $90 billion. These include: (i) PNs on derivatives (around $30 billion); and (ii) PNs on underlying securities/cash (around $60 billion).
Regulators and market sources argue that PNs on derivatives are used to circumvent external commercial borrowing (ECB) rules, avoid taxes, and allow 'round-tripping' of copious monies. A common structure allowing large Indian corporates with overseas affiliates to get around the ECB caps involves the corporate pledging its shares with an Indian bank's offshore subsidiary. In turn, the Indian bank offshore provides a loan to the Indian corporate offshore. The offshore Indian corporate buys equity warrants, issued by its parent onshore via PNs on derivatives. Market sources suggest that the large size of the present PNs on derivatives may in part be stemming from such structures.
These types of structures also result in some capital inflows from hedges on PN derivatives positions. Market sources in Hong Kong, Singapore and London suggest that margins (i.e., down payments on futures positions) are roughly about 25-30 percent. Although counterintuitive, $7.5-$9 billion (i.e., 25-30 percent of $30 billion PN derivatives) has come into India from such margin accounts due to losses on futures positions, without the initial transaction being closed yet. These inflows, along with the regular capital inflows via cash PNs, and the flows from many investors' taking long foreign exchange positions have placed an additional upward pressure on the rupee, over and above the pressures from onshore FII flows.
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Regulatory response
SEBI's proposed measures that were adopted recently will discontinue new issuance of PNs on derivatives by FIIs (and their sub-accounts) with immediate effect; existing positions will be required to wind up within 18 months. Furthermore, FIIs that have issued PNs on cash will need to bring the notional value outstanding to no more than 40 percent of their assets under custody in India, as such positions expire/close out. FIIs with current positions below 40 percent of their AUC, can issue only at the incremental rate of 5 percent of their AUC.
The demand for PNs on underlying securities/cash are from investors who would like to come onshore, but either they are waiting to receive a license, or cannot come onshore since they are not regulated in a SEBI recognized jurisdiction. These investors also include hedge funds which have used PNs since they found the registration as an FII to be an onerous process. 9 The 40 percent cap on AUC (assets under custody) on foreign flows may impact inflows for two reasons. 10 First, there still remains some ambiguity regarding certain terms (i.e., 'registered entity', 'regulated entity'). If SEBI requires that only regulated entities can be registered, some hedge funds will not be able to come onshore (see Appendix 2 on 'Regulated Entity'). Secondly, FIIs who have hedged with one leg of the transaction in PN derivatives and the other via cash may unwind their positions as the PN derivative leg is no longer available. Thus, for these two reasons, the 40 percent regulatory cap could also impact the inflows.
Possible impact from the regulatory changes
SEBI's ban on the issuance of PNs on derivatives will reshuffle the investor base on portfolio inflows. 11 Its proposal may increase the inflows onshore by the apparent interest from real money accounts to register onshore (including pension, endowments, charitable trusts etc); however, inflows from margin accounts (i.e., from investors who use PNs on derivatives) are likely to disappear along with some investors from the PN cash market. Inflows from PNs on derivatives will not be replaced since this route allowed transactions that cannot be mimicked onshore. The near-term impact depends on how staggered the unwinding is likely to be.
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Once the reshuffling of the investor base in favor of the real money account takes place over the next 18 months, capital flows are likely to be more stable.
9 SEBI reported positions of total or cumulative PNs outstanding are after adding (not netting) the reported positions by all FIIs and their sub-accounts. It is very likely possible that some FIIs may hold offsetting positions on certain securities. Market participants have a range of numbers for such offsetting positions but in the absence of such details, the $30 billion and $60 billion split is the best to assume.
10 Market sources also suggest that a sizable number of PN users were from unregulated jurisdictions.
11 Also, the ban on PN on derivatives will not impact liquidity of both the SENSEX and the associated hedges on the Nifty; these markets are very liquid. (1) FII or sub account may issue, deal in or hold, off-shore derivative instruments such as PNs, equity-linked notes, or any other similar instruments against underlying securities, listed or proposed to be listed on any stock exchange in India, only if favor of those entities which are regulated by any relevant authority in the countries of their incorporation or establishment, subject to compliance of 'know your client', requirement.
Provided that if any such instrument has already been issued, prior to February 3, 2004 to a person other than a regulated entity, contract for such a transaction shall expire on maturity of the instrument or within a period of five years from February 3, 2004 whichever is earlier.
(2) A FII or sub account shall ensure that no further down stream issue or transfer of any instrument referred to in sub-regulations (i) is made to any person other than a regulated entity.
Appendix I. Offshore Demand for Rupee-Linked Securities
The appendix provides some information on the offshore demand for rupee-linked securities that has been met by recent issuance from International Financial Institutions (all AAA rated). The demand is primarily from real money accounts that cannot take exposure via derivative markets and provides some idea to the extent of repricing that may ensue if the Indian Government relaxes the caps on the local debt holdings by foreign investors in conjunction with an earnest desire to develop this market.
Only around 1 percent or less of the Government of India debt securities (Gsec) market is with foreigners, one of the lowest among emerging markets (see Figure) . 13 Regulators have been wary of inviting large scale foreign investment in debt (unlike in equities) amid concerns that this would encourage large speculative flows that could pose a systemic risk. The local debt market could benefit from further deepening and liquidity that is in evidence from recent offshore rupee issues.
There is growing demand for offshore rupee-linked paper from real money accounts (who are not allowed to hold derivatives), given the caps on foreign investor flows to the Indian local currency debt market. Inter-American Development Bank issued the first offshore rupee bond for in February this year for Rupees 1 billion with a 3-year tenor. In May, the IADB issued another offshore rupee bond (Rupees 1.5 billion, 8.25 percent, 10 years). Since then, another supranational, the World Bank, has placed a similar issue in June (Rupees 1.25 billion, 7.25 percent coupon, 3 year), and the EBRD went further on the tenor in July (Rupees 1 billion, 7 percent coupon, 5 year).
The size of these issues may not be large in U.S. dollars, but this information is only from issuance by AAA credits. Market sources indicate sizable demand for offshore-rupee exposure by real money accounts that are not allowed to take a derivative position via the rupee NDF market or, do not want to take Gsec exposure due to liquidity, credit or other reason. Many other institutions, especially investment banks and structured product boutiques that are below AAA also issue such securities for private placements. Thus the AAA issuance provides a snapshot of the offshore demand for rupee exposure.
A typical offshore-rupee transaction involves an IFI that acts as an intermediary between foreign investors who want rupee exposure and a counterparty that (for hedging or other reasons) is willing to take a reverse position on the rupee than that of the foreign investor.
14 Market sources indicate that the AAA rating of the IFIs allows such investors to take the currency risk but eliminate any credit risk. There is no rupee changing hands. The dollars received from foreign investors (and the rupee risk) is passed by the IFI to a counterparty offshore. The coupons and principal are paid by the counterparty, in dollars to the IFI and passed on to the investors. 15 All coupon and principal payments are in dollars at the prevailing rupee/dollar exchange rate on the day such payments are due. Such issues incorporate information of comparable issues from the onshore Gsec curve and also the rupee NDF swap market. 16 These issues are not just for short maturities; the EBRD issue is for a 5-year tenor and the second IADB issue is for a 10-year tenor. The fact that the first IADB came "inside" the 3 year comparable Gsec was due, in part, to the opportunity for international investors to participate in the Indian rupee bond market without having to meet the local restrictions. All other supranational issues coupons have also come inside (i.e., on average about 50-60 basis points lower) than comparable Gsec issues. Since foreign investors were primarily concerned about credit risk (and thus chose a AAA IFI), such 'loss in their coupon' is a proxy for the credit enhancement. It is difficult to disentangle the impact from other factors, such as tax, liquidity etc, that may be associated with the preference for offshore issues.
If the rupee hovers around 40/U.S. dollar, market sources envisage a longer tenor and a larger bond issue soon. Presently, with no clear direction for the rupee since April the larger Indian corporates such as Infosys, TCS, Satyam have doubled (and some have tripled) their foreign exchange hedges; however, due to the domestic regulations, these are unlikely to be candidates as the offshore counterparty via their offshore affiliates.
The IFI rupee-linked issuance, so far, has already developed a shadow GSec offshore curve up to 10 years. 17 It is widely acknowledged that the Indian domestic institutional investor base of insurance companies and provident funds, and banks, is a captive audience for the Indian GSecs at almost all points of the curve. Thus, the demand from offshore real money investors is a useful barometer for pricing the GSec curve and may be a useful signal as the regulators contemplate opening this moribund market for foreigners, especially to finance infrastructure projects. For clarification, the overnight-interest swap curve (OIS) is an onshore derivative play.
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17 It is not clear why one supranational (IADB) was requested not to issue such rupee-linkers and then others are allowed to (India is a member of the WB, but not of the EBRD or IADB).
18 Foreign investors take a position on the policy rate via the short end of the OIS curve that is liquid and can be rolled to almost 3 years.
